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Abstract 
The  Fischler  reform  of  the  CAP  deepened  the  decoupling  process  of  agricultural 
support started with the 1992 reform, introducing the Single Payment Scheme (SPS). Two 
models  could  be  used  to  apply  the  SPS:  in  the  historic  model  payments  are  based  on 
individual reference amounts; in the regional model payments are based on regional reference 
amounts. Italy chose to apply the historic model, thus “freezing” the distribution of support to 
farms at the historic reference level. 
The recent Proposal on the Health Check of the CAP envisaged Member States being 
allowed to adjust their model towards a flatter rate of the SPS from 2010, a move that could 
become compulsory for Member States after 2013. 
The paper analyses the effects at territorial and farm level of the application of a flat 
rate payment in Italy as a replacement for the current payment based on the historic farm 
reference. The analysis makes it possible to assess and quantify the redistribution effects of 
alternative  hypotheses  of  “regionalization”,  highlighting  how  these  effects,  at  farm  and 
territorial level, are heavily dependent on the land use on the basis of which support was 
calculated in the reference period, by the criterion utilized to define “region”, as well as the 
percentage of regionalization chosen. 
The originality and significance of the work lies in the fact that, to the best of our 
knowledge, no similar works at farm level are currently available for Italy. 
The  aim  of  the  territorial  analysis  is  to  identify  the  amount  of  resources  to  be 
redistributed across different areas of Italy according to the definition of “region” adopted 
(administrative Regions, territorial ”macro-regions”, Italy as a whole) and the percentage of 
regionalization adopted (10%, 50%, 100%). 
The farm analysis is based on the 2006 Italian sample of FADN (Farm Accountancy 
Data Network) that contains, roughly, 14,000 farms. For each hypothesis the analysis has 
considered: the distribution of farms by class of the difference between payments (historic 
and simulated), to highlight the redistribution of support to farms in the “region” considered; 
the percentage of farms that gain/lose in excess of a certain amount of support; finally, the 
redistribution effects are also evaluated in terms of crop land uses. The analysis highlights the 
fact  that  the  larger  the  “region”  the  greater  are  the  redistribution  effects.  Moreover,  as 
expected, these redistribution effects are more pronounced the wider the diversification of 
crop land uses, and, therefore, the support received in the historic reference period. 
 




The Fischler reform approved in 2003 represented a turning pointing in the concept of 
“first pillar” of the CAP. The Single Payment Scheme (SPS), in fact, deepened the decoupling 
process of the agricultural support that began with the MacSharry reform, removing the link 
between support received by producers and what they produce and linking instead support to 
the possession of the land and the to exercising an agricultural activity in the respect of cross 
compliance. 
The SPS can be applied in two ways (EC Regulation n. 1782/2003). The first, historic, 
entails that each farm receives a payment equal to the average support received by the same 
farm in the historic reference period. In the eleven countries (Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Spain, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Scotland and Wales) that opted to apply this 
model there was, consequently, a “freezing” of the distribution of support among farms. The 
second model entails a criterion of regionalized distribution, on the basis of which all farmers 
receive a flat rate payment per hectare of equal value in each of the “regions” identified, 
irrespective of whether or not they had, in the past, enjoyed direct CAP payments and, if so, 
of their amounts. The regionalized model was adopted by England, Germany and Finland, 
where,  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  years,  it  will  become  progressively  enforced.  The 
remaining  countries  in  the  EU-15  (Denmark,  Luxemburg,  Sweden  and  Northern  Ireland) 
adopted  hybrid  models  that  contain  both  regionalized  and  historic  elements
1.  Finally,  the 
twelve new Member States had the option of applying until 2010 - for Romania and Bulgaria 
until  2011-  a  simplified  regime,  at  the  end  of  which  they  have  to  adopt  the  Single 
Regionalized Payments Scheme. 
The  recent  legislative  Proposals  on  the  so-called  Health  Check  of  the  CAP 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008b) envisage radical modifications to the 
Fischler reform with the aim of weakening the link between support received at the present 
and past level of production (or types of production) in order to move toward a flatter rate 
payment. Member States are allowed to flatten, either in part or completely, the amount of 
entitlements by way of two mechanisms: regionalization and approximation. 
Until  2013,  therefore,  the  move  towards  a  more  flat  rate  payment  reducing  the 
differences in the support received by farms in the same “region” seems destined to be left to 
the decision of Member States; after that date, however, the move could become compulsory, 
also because, at that point, it would be difficult to justify such widely differing systems of 
support implemented across EU-15. 
                                                 
1 For a description of the SPS model applied in France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Great Britain, the reasons on 
which the choices are made and the expected redistribution effects see Swinbank et al., 2004. An evaluation of 
the environmental effect of the two models of application of the SPS in England is contained in English Nature, 
2003. 4
As regards the application of the Fischler reform, Italy adopted the historic model of 
redistribution so as to preserve the historic beneficiaries of the first pillar of the CAP. If this 
model has enabled, in the short term, the principle of total decoupling to be accepted, it is not 
sustainable in the longer term, especially in the light of the completion of the Fischler reform 
that will entail the complete decoupling of the support from what is produced and how, for all 
CMOs (Community Market Organizations). In fact, it would become increasingly difficult to 
justify the fact that farms with the same production profile, the same internal organization and 
the same production techniques receive different levels of support merely on the basis of what 
they received, or did not receive, in the past. Although it is not our intention here to discuss 
the justification of the support allocated through the SPS (payment for the supply of public 
goods and services? a system of selective support for farms or regions? income support?
2), it 
has become increasingly clear today, and it will be even more so in the future, that there will 
be a need to re-examine the system of allocation of support between areas and farms in order 
to find a more equitable redistributive model. With reference to this, the regionalized model 
appears far more equitable than the system based on historic farm reference. In the context of 
the “region” of reference, this model will bring about a reduction in the differences in support 
received by farms and consequently (depending of the percentage of regionalization) a more 
or less skewed distribution of support between farmers. Regionalization, nevertheless, does 
not  resolve  the  problem  of  unfair  distribution  of  support  between  “regions”  and  Member 
States determined, once again, by the support each received in the historic reference period 
(Anania, 2008). 
The aim of the present work is to quantify the redistribution effects, both at territorial 
and farm level, of alternative hypotheses of regionalization based on the legislative Proposals 
on the Health Check of the CAP (Commission of the European Communities, 2008b), in 
order to help the current debate on this issue in Italy. Given the prospect of a possible move to 
a flat rate payment the results obtained could provide a useful basis to help decision makers 
and stakeholders work out how to apply “regionalization” in our country. The work, in fact, 
highlights  how,  both  at  territorial  and  farm  level,  the  redistribution  effects  of  alternative 
hypotheses on “regionalization” are heavily dependent on the crop land uses on the basis of 
which support was calculated in the historic reference period, by the criterion used to define 
“region”, as well as by the percentage of regionalization adopted. 
The  following  section  describes  the  proposals  of  the  Health  Check  regarding 
regionalization. Section 3 examines the working hypotheses and the methodology employed. 
The  results  of  the  elaborations  are  contained  in  Section  4  and  the  final  section  draws 
conclusions from the study undertaken. 
 
                                                 
2 For a useful discussion on the economic justification of the SPS at the time of the introduction of the Fischler 
reform see Sotte, 2005. 5
Health Check Proposals on regionalization 
The  legislative  Proposals  on  the  Health  Check  of  the  CAP  (Commission  of  the 
European Communities, 2008b) involved a complete rewriting of the EC Regulation on direct 
payments (no. 1782/2003). With this in mind the Proposal foresees two mechanisms: 
regionalization; 
approximation. 
Regionalization allows Member States that adopt the historic model of the SPS today, 
if they so wish, to move to the regionalized model from 2010. A Member State may decide to 
regionalize no more than 50% of the regional ceiling. Consequently, it will become possible 
to divide up to 50% of the regional ceiling between all the farmers whose holdings are located 
in the “region” concerned, including those that on the currently applied historic model do not 
hold payment entitlements (because they were not beneficiaries of direct payments in the 
reference period), on the basis of the hectares the farmer declares in 2010. The remaining part 
(at least 50% of the regional ceiling) will be divided to historic beneficiaries only (i.e. those 
currently held entitlements) – in addition to what they receive on the basis of regionalized 
distribution  –  in  proportion  to  the  value  of  their  payment  entitlements  matured  over  the 
historic period. 
In Member States that decide to move to the regionalized model, the old entitlements 
will be cancelled and substituted by new ones. The number of entitlements per farmer will be 
equal to the number of hectares the farmer declares in 2010. 
As  will  be  shown  in  Section  4  of  this  work,  the  higher  the  percentage  of 
regionalization,  the  greater  the  redistribution  of  support  within  the  “region”,  because  the 
larger will be the share of support to be redistributed on the basis of the overall area of all 
farms, regardless of what each farmer receives today.  
Moreover, the larger the “region” and the more diversified is likely to be the historic 
crop land uses (and, thus, the support per hectare received by farms in the reference period on 
the  basis  of  which  the single  farm  payment  was  calculated)  the  greater  the  redistribution 
effect. The redistribution between the farms for the part associated to the “regionalized” flat 
rate payment will very much depend on the hectares declared in 2010. As regards this, it 
should be noted that the choice to set a future date for the distribution of entitlements between 
the beneficiaries could have severe repercussions on the transfer and allocation of land, and 
thereby on the landed property market, in the run up to 2010 since it is to be expected that 
before that date owners will be reluctant to sell/let land, in the wait for the attribution of 
entitlements. 
Of particular interest is the question of “special entitlements”. These are the ones held 
by  livestock  farmers,  who  prior  to  the  Fischler  reform  received  headage  payments  (for 
example, slaughtering premiums), to obtain which it was not necessary to declare or possess 6
any land area. Not being linked to the ownership of land, the beneficiaries of this kind of 
support  did  not  necessarily  have  a  reference  area  to  attach  to  their  entitlement.  For  such 
farmers  a  derogation  is  envisaged  from  the  obligation  to  provide  a  number  of  hectares 
equivalent to a number of entitlements, on the condition that at least 50% of the agricultural 
activity  exercised  in  the  reference  period,  expressed  in  Livestock  Units  is  maintained. 
Consequently, the farmers that hold special entitlements “without land” would be severely 
damaged by the flat rate redistribution based on the number of hectares declared at a given 
date. Actually, the treatment of special entitlements in the proposed Regulation is somewhat 
ambiguous. If the relevant article states explicitly that “The special entitlements shall not be 
modified” (Commission of the European Communities, 2008b, third indent of Article 45 (2)) 
when one turns to regulation of regionalization (contained in another Chapter of the same 
Title III) nothing is mentioned about the possible exclusion of special entitlements. On the 
contrary, and this is the important point, it is explicitly stated that “Payment entitlements held 
by farmers before the division referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 [in historic and regionalized 
quotas] shall be cancelled and replaced by the new entitlements referred in paragraph 3 
[determined  by  the  number  of  hectares  the  farmer  declares  in  2010]”  (Article  48). 
Consequently, in the case of regionalization the intensive livestock farms are those who risk 
to  lose  most,  for  being  “without  land”,  unless  the  special  entitlements  are  not  explicitly 
excluded from the regionalization process
3. 
Approximation allows, on the other hand, to reduce the differences in the value of 
current entitlements in the “region” of reference. This mechanism operates, therefore, only for 
currently held entitlements. As the implications of approximation fall outside the scope of this 
work, we shall concentrate here solely on the mechanism of regionalization. 
After the publication of the Commission Communication and the Regulation Proposal 
on  the  CAP  Health  Check  the  preliminary  evaluations  began  to  circulate  on  the  possible 
effects of regionalization. 
In Italy the first efforts to assess the effects of redistribution at territorial level of the 
introduction  of  a  flat  rate  payment  per  hectare  were  carried  out  by  Anania  (2008)  and 
Frascarelli  (2008)  following  the  presentation  of  the  Communication  in  November  2007 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2007). The preliminary analyses were carried 
out  based  on  the  “regions”  defined  for  the  attribution  of  payment  entitlements  from  the 
                                                 
3 In Germany, for example, where in 2013 the adoption of per hectare flat rate payment on the basis of 100% 
regionalization  will  be  completed,  the  headage  payments  will  be  gradually  integrated  in  the  ceiling  to  be 
regionalized without exception. The holders of special entitlements that have not acquired land will suffer a 
reduction in support  (in 2013 with respect to 2005) estimated to be in the region of between €300 and €5,000 
per hectare (Swinbank et al., 2004). Also in England, DEFRA (2005) estimated that the move to a decoupled 
payment calculated on a flat rate basis per hectare will entail problems for large-scale dairy farms, that in 2012 – 
the year in which the process of regionalization will be completed – they will find their income reduced by 17% 
compared to the income derived from payments linked to the possession of quotas. Similarly, and for the same 
reason, losses are predicted for intensive cattle farms. The most recent update of the estimates, based on the 
results of the first year of application of SPS in England, substantially confirms the results predicted for dairy 
farms (DEFRA 2007a, 2007b). 7
national reserve. From both works it becomes clear that there will be a marked redistribution 
from the lowland areas of Southern, Central and Northern Italy and the hilly areas of Southern 
Italy  in  favor  of  other  areas  of  the  country.  More  recently  Anania  and  Tenuta  (2008) 
quantified the effects of alternative hypotheses of regionalization on the territorial distribution 
of the single farm payment in Italy using different assumptions with respect to the “regions”. 
In its evaluation of the impact of the reform Proposal (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2008a), the European Commission examined the social impact (redistribution 
effects),  the  economic  impact  (effects  on  land  prices  and  transfer  efficiency),  the 
environmental  impact  and  the  impact  on  administrative  simplification  of  four  alternative 
hypotheses  of  regionalization:  EU-wide  flat  rate  per  eligible  hectare,  Simplified  Area 
Payment Scheme for all Member States of the EU, regional flat rates per eligible hectare, and 
regional flat rate per entitlement. The evaluation highlighted the fact that the first hypothesis 
would have a considerable redistributive effect across Member States (Italy, for example, 
would be among the Member States worse off in the case of a flat rate payment calculated for 
EU-27,  estimated  to  be  in  the  region  of  20%).  The  second  hypothesis  is  not  considered 
desirable because it is conceived as a transitional scheme implemented to help new Member 
States  move  towards  the  SPS;  the  third  and  fourth  hypothesis,  on  the  other  hand,  are 
translated into instruments of regionalization and approximation, respectively, because they 
are considered equitable from the point of view of redistribution and have a limited impact on 
the capitalization of support in terms of land value. 
Studies on the impact of the proposal of regionalization contained in the Health Check 
are limited to Member States that in 2004 chose to use the historic model to apply the SPS. 
In France, for example, Chatellier has carried out numerous studies in order to assess 
the impact of alternative scenarios of redistribution of support on French farms (Chatellier, 
2007 and 2008). In particular, the author has analyzed the impact on French farm income of 
two alternative hypotheses of regionalization: a regional and a national flat rate payment per 
hectare. The author concluded that in the hypothesis of national flat rate payment there would 
be a greater redistribution of support from the specialized cereal areas to the areas specialized 
in  cattle  and  sheep  production.  The  regional  flat  rate  payment,  instead,  reduces  the 
redistributive effects, limiting redistribution to farms located in the “region”. Chatellier draws 
attention to the fact that, regardless of the size of the “region” considered, a payment per 
hectare is proportional to the farm area but does not appear in any way linked to employment, 
income or to the quality of public goods produced (i.e. goods and services produced which 
have  no  market  value).  For  this  reason  the  author  advocates  a  change  in  the  support 
instruments used under the CAP to make them more justifiable from the taxpayer’s point of 
view. 
In  the  other  EU  Member  States  there  have  also  been  impact  assessments  of 
regionalization carried at the time of the Fischler reform in 2003. Among these, one produced 
in England by DEFRA (2005) estimated the redistribution of resources for type of farm and 8
for  region  and  the  possible  amount  of  per  hectare  payment  in  the  two “regions”  initially 
identified in order to realize regionalization (SDA-Severely Damaged Area, non-SDA). Then, 
the disadvantaged area was further subdivided into SDA moorland and SDA non-moorland. 
Once the reform comes into force (2012), it is estimated the overall redistribution, from those 
who  lose  out  to  those  who  gain  under  regionalization,  will  be  around  13%  of  historic 
resources. At aggregate level and once reform completely applied, an average loss has been 
estimated of 9% for diary farms vis-à-vis historic payments (affecting farmers in different 
ways depending on the size of the farm). For smaller farms, in fact, a gain of slightly under 
40% has been calculated, while for larger businesses the loss would be around 17%. In the 
same manner large-scale cereal farms, mixed farms, medium to large-scale cattle or sheep 
farms  and  large-scale  pig-breeding  and  poultry  farms  would  tend  to  lose  out.  With 
regionalization, on the other hand, fruit and vegetables farms of all sizes would gain. 
In the analysis carried out in Wales (Welsh Assembly Government, 2004) emerged 
major redistribution effects of regionalization depending on the various options adopted. A 
flat  rate  payment  per  hectare  defined  on  a  national  basis  would  determine  over  a  60% 
redistribution  of  historic  resources,  mainly  from  smaller  to  larger  farms.  Differentiated 
payments between disadvantaged  and non disadvantaged  areas would reduce the negative 
impact for livestock farmers (cattle and sheep) in disadvantaged areas, but would exacerbate 
the negative impact for the same kind of farmers on the lowland areas. Redistribution based 
on  20%  regionalization  would  affect  only  13%  of  the  historic  amount  of  resources,  thus 
mitigating the effects estimated on the basis of 100% regionalization. On the basis of the 
economic impact of redistribution (production, administrative costs, cross compliance, land 
values)  and  on  net  annual  farm  income  of  the  different  options  considered,  Wales  has 
subsequently decided to apply the historic model. 
 
Hypotheses adopted and methodology used 
On  the  basis  of  indications  contained  in  the  legislative  proposal,  preliminary 
hypotheses on how to divide Italy into “regions” have been formulated. Three alternative 
hypotheses of “regions” have been considered: 
a)  20 administrative Regions
4; 
b)  4  territorial  “macro-regions”  (Northern  Italy,  Central  Italy,  Southern 
Italy, the Islands); 
c)  Italy as a single “region”. 
                                                 
4 The 20 administrative Regions into  which Italy is politically divided. Each Region, in turn, is divided in 
Provinces.  9
The final hypothesis supplies an extreme scenario that does not constitute a realistic 
outcome  in  this  intermediate  revision  of  the  Fischler  reform,  but  it  could,  nevertheless, 
become significant in the long term. 
The analysis was carried out on the assumption that regionalization would take place 
in 2006, leaving everything else unchanged. Consequently, the reform of the CMOs for wine 
and fruit and vegetables, which stipulated that relative support would be included in SPS from 
2008, was not considered. As a result, as regards the effects of regionalization, the positive 
redistributive effects in favor of historic wine and fruit and vegetables producers (and areas) 
and the negative effects on the other producers (and areas) are overestimated. In the same 
manner, the analysis does not consider the rise in the value of entitlements for beet producers 
as the relative reform of the sugar CMO comes in force. This leads to an overestimation of the 
possible gains for beet producers (and areas) and an underestimation of the possible losses for 
the  same  producers  (and  areas).  The  opposite  is  true  for  other  producers  (and  areas). 
Similarly,  no  account  is  taken  of  the  transfer  to  rural  development  of  50%  resources  of 
tobacco CMO to take place in 2010. Here too, this leads to an overestimation both of the 
negative effects for tobacco producers (and areas) who will suffer less than expected and the 
positive effects for other producers (and areas), who will gain less than expected. Finally, in 
this work no account is taken of the reform contained in the Health Check Proposals with 
reference to minimum thresholds
5, modulation and inclusion of some direct payments in the 
SPS
6. 
The Regulation Proposal stated that the national ceiling, fixed in Appendix VIII of the 
same  document,  is  divided  into  regional  ceilings  according  to  objective  and  non-
discriminatory criteria. In order to take in account that part of the national ceiling is utilized 
for  the  purposes  of  support  other  than  support  which  falls  within  the  SPS
7,  it  has  been 
considered advisable to proceed with the assignment of regional ceilings starting from a value 
of the overall entitlements assigned to the beneficiaries, that represents the maximum amount 
of payable SPS earmarked for Italy
8. Indeed, in both 2005 and 2006, that is to say in the first 
two years of application of the Fischler reform in Italy, all the ceiling for SPS was assigned in 
the form of entitlements, to such an extent that, in both years, an adjustment had to be made in 
the value of the entitlements to bring the overall amount within the limits imposed by the 
                                                 
5 In 2006 the minimum threshold was set at €50. In 2007 Italy raised the threshold to €100. This difference is not 
considered in the work. 
6 The proposal is to include in the SPS the quality premium for durum wheat, support for protein crops, rice and 
seeds, community aid for nuts, payment for flax and hemp grown for fibre, aid for processing dried fodder, 
potato starch premium and aid for starch potatoes. 
7 In Italy, for example, to grant additional payment  in accordance with Article 69 for arable crops, beef and veal 
and sheep and goat meat and sugar sectors and for the coupled aids to seeds. 
8  The  national  ceiling  for  2006  for  Italy  was  €3,791,893,000  (Appendix  VIII  of  the  EC  Regulation  n. 
1782/2003). The amount regarding the SPS is set annually with a specific Regulation. For 2006 for Italy it was 
€3,593,132,000  (EC Regulation n. 1156/2006). In the same year the value of entitlements attributed by AGEA 
was 3,576,422,476. The difference is made up by the national reserve. 10
ceiling. The value of SPS utilized for 2006 (equal to €3,576,422,476) had already been cut to 
feed the national reserve but was before the cuts due to the modulation
9. 
The next step was the calculation of the flat rate payment in each of the alternative 
hypotheses  of  “region”,  according  to  three  different  percentages  of  support  subject  to 
regionalization: 10%, 50% and 100%. The last threshold, similarly to the third hypothesis of 
Italy as a single “region”, is put forward as a reference point for an extreme regionalization 
scenario, one which has not been considered in the proposal but could, nevertheless, become 
relevant when decisions are taken further along the road. The calculation of flat rate payment 
per  hectare  has  been  carried  out  by  dividing  the  part  of  the  regional  ceiling  subject  to 
regionalization by the UAA (Utilized Agricultural Area) of the “region” considered
10.  
Finally, to take into account the ambiguity found in Section 2 on the treatment to be 
reserved for special entitlements, the calculation of flat rate payments has been carried out in 
two ways, first taking all entitlements into account including the special entitlements that in 
some way are included in the regionalization, and secondly excluding these from the ceiling 
subject to regionalization. In total, therefore, 18 scenarios with different flat rate payments 
were  hypothesized:  one  for  each  of  the  three  different  definitions  of  “region”,  for  three 
different  percentages  of  regionalization,  for  two  different  hypotheses  regarding  special 
entitlements. 
At this point the flat rate payment per hectare for each of the 18 scenarios considered 
was carried out, and for each Province it was possible to calculate the difference (“losses” or 
“gains”) in absolute and percentage terms of the new amounts of resources deriving from the 
hypothesis of regionalization considered with respect to the status quo defined by the value of 
resources  attributed  in  2006.  Moreover,  in  each  administrative  Region  it  was  possible  to 
estimate the amount of resources redistributed internally (the amount of support transferred 
from those Provinces who lose out to those who gain) and the amount of resources that the 
administrative Region loses or gains with the increase in size of the “region” considered, 
moving from administrative Region, to territorial macro-region to the third hypothesis, Italy 
as single “region”. 
Bearing in mind the fact that regional ceilings are defined on the basis of the value of 
the  entitlements  attributed  and  not  by  the  maximum  ceiling  for  SPS  stipulated  in  EC 
Regulation n. 1156/2006, we find that single flat rate payment is underestimated by an order 
of magnitude of 0.5% which corresponds to the existing national reserve in 2006, i.e. the part 
of the national reserve put aside and not redistributed as entitlements.  
                                                 
9 The data were supplied by AGEA, the Agency for allocation of funds for agriculture, to the working party 
made up by MIPAAF to evaluate the options and the impact on Italian agriculture of the proposals contained in 
the Health Check (MiPAAF, 2008). 
10 The proposal speaks of eligible hectares. Based on the definition contained in Article 35 (2) this corresponds 
to the UAA. For further details on the make up of UAA in 2006 see Pupo D’Andrea, 2008. 11
The analysis at the farm level was conducted considering the farms which are part of 
the  FADN-ITALIA  sample  in  2006.  It  was  carried  out  on  14,100  of  the  15,379  farms 
contained in the FADN sample in 2006. In fact, because of the lack of information on single 
payments received by the farms in Emilia Romagna in the sample, it was necessary to exclude 
the 1,279 farms from that Region from our calculations. 
The amount of support that each farm of the FADN sample would receive on the basis 
of the UAA and the flat rate payment in each of the considered hypotheses was calculated. 
As  regards  this,  it  needs  to  be  said  that  in  the  farm  analysis  there  are  only  nine 
scenarios evaluating the effects of regionalization. Indeed, because of the impossibility of 
obtaining information on which farms hold special entitlements from the FADN sample, the 
analysis has been limited to the hypotheses in  which special  entitlements are included in 
regionalization. The scenarios, therefore, are those relating to three “regions” and the three 
percentages of regionalization, taking into consideration special entitlements in the amount to 
be redistributed. 
Moreover, it was considered useful to work with the values of the single payment that 
had not already been affected by the cut of modulation. This allowed us to take account of the 
fact that regionalization involves a change in the support received by each farm that could 
influence the amount of resources drained off by the modulation (by changing the distribution 
of farms that fall below or above the franchise of 5,000 euro).  
In each scenario flat rate payment per hectare has been applied to UAA per each farm. 
From the comparison between historic support unaffected by the 2006 modulation and the 
support  due  to  farms  on  the  basis  of  the  regionalization  hypotheses  considered,  we  have 
obtained the redistribution of farm for class of the variation (in percentage and absolute value) 
of support received according to the alternative hypotheses of “region” and the percentage of 
regionalization. This enabled us to identify the critical  areas of redistribution (how many 
farms gain, and how many lose out over a certain amount) and the crop land uses (Types of 
Farming - TF) most affected by the redistribution. 
 
Results of the analysis 
Expected effects of regionalization at territorial level 
As mentioned before, the analysis of the territorial effects of regionalization took into 
account 18 different scenarios. The objective is to identify the amount of resources that will 
be  redistributed  between  different  areas  of  Italy  depending  on  the  definition  of  “region” 
adopted (administrative Region, territorial macro-regions, Italy as a whole) and the percentage 
of regionalization chosen (100%, 50%, 10%) under the hypothesis that special entitlements 
will be treated as ordinary ones and, therefore, subject to regionalization or that the special 
entitlements will be excluded from the flat rate redistribution. 12
The redistributive effects of regionalization are directly linked to the crop land uses on 
the  basis  of  which  historic  support  was  calculated.  The  larger  the  region  and,  therefore, 
presumably wider the diversification of land use in the historic reference period, the greater 
will  be  the  effects  of  redistribution  (Anania,  2008).  In  the  same  way,  the  greater  the 
percentage of regionalization, the more substantial will be the transfer of resources. 
The total amount of the transfer of resources at territorial level, therefore, will be 
linked to the “distance” between per hectare payment received in the past. In general terms, 
the  effects  of  regionalization  will  tend to  privilege  crop  land  uses  which  had  little  or  no 
support in the past (fruit and vegetables except those for processing, vineyards, large-scale 
livestock  rearing)  and  penalize  crop  land  uses  that  in  the  historic  reference  period  were 
favored  through  higher  support  (milk,  olive  oil,  tobacco,  rice  but  also  tomatoes  for 
processing).  Consequently,  the  loss  or  gain  in  each  administrative  Region  (and,  in  this 
context, in each Province) will depend on the crop land uses and per hectare related support in 
the reference period used for the calculation of the single payment compared to the average 
for the “region”. The objective of the analysis carried out in the following pages is to quantify 
these effects. 
In the territorial analysis we shall reflect on the hypothesis of 50% regionalization, 
which is the maximum envisaged in the legislative Proposals. The results will be directly 
extended to all the other regionalization proposals (10% and 100% but also all the possible 
intermediate solutions as well as a percentage below 10%). The sign of the variation for each 
Province  remains  the  same;  what  does  change,  in  the  move  from  one  percentage  of 
regionalization to another, is the scale of the effect. It is evident that the greater the level of 
regionalization, the greater will be the redistribution of resources within the “region”. 
The first scenario considered is one in which the “region” is defined as administrative 
Region. In this first simulation, the net balance for the administrative Region is naturally zero, 
insofar as the redistribution can only take place within the Region itself and not between one 
Region and another. One can witness, however, a significant redistribution between different 
areas (Provinces) inside the Region. 
In the scenario of 50% regionalization with special entitlements included, the Regions 
within  which  the  greater  transfer  of  resources  is  recorded  (i.e.  resources  transferred  from 
certain  Provinces  to  other  Provinces  of  the  same  administrative  Region)  are  Apulia  and 
Lombardy  followed by  Calabria and Veneto
11.  In relative terms, that is in relation to the 
historic support for each Region, the highest percentage of support redistribution is recorded 
in Abruzzo, where 50% regionalization would imply a move from one Province to another of 
13% of historic regional resources overall (Fig.1). The Regions with the least redistribution 
                                                 
11 For more detail see the paper presented at the annual Congress of the Italian Society for Agrarian Economics 
that can be found along with the relevant tables of appendix on: www.inea.it:80/opaue/health _index.cfm (Pupo 
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between Provinces in this case are Basilicata (0.4% of historic resources) and Trentino Alto 
Adige (1.13%). 
Yet, when special entitlements are excluded from regionalization, it appears that the 
redistribution  of  resources  is  higher  in  some  Provinces,  on  account  of  the  greater 
heterogeneity  of  the  crop  land  uses,  that  gave  birth  to  historic  support  without  special 
entitlements.  A  case  in  point  is  Trentino  Alto  Adige,  where  the  amount  of  resources 
transferred from one Province to another is roughly 1.4 million euro, as opposed to 300,000 
euro when special entitlements are included. This is so because, notwithstanding lower flat 
rate payment per hectare, Trento currently receives resources (excluding special entitlements) 
based on historic crop land uses that enjoyed greater support under the CAP than Bolzano. 
Consequently, the latter obtains more resources in the form of flat rate regionalized payment 
(detracting them from Trento). 
The second scenario is that of “region” defined as territorial macro-regions. In this 
case,  there  is  redistribution  both  between  administrative  Regions  and  between  Provinces 
within each macro-region. Within the macro-region Northern Italy witnesses a redistribution 
of resources from Lombardy and Veneto towards other Regions, in particular Trentino Alto 
Adige and Emilia Romagna (Tab.1). The Provinces within the latter Regions, together with 
those of Liguria, all show a net gain from regionalization (Fig. 2). On the subject of Northern 
Italy  as  “region”  we  should  point  out  that  the  exclusion  of  special  entitlements  from 
regionalization involves only minor variations in the final values of losses and gains, apart 
from in Friuli which should gain if the special entitlements are included in regionalization and 
lose  otherwise.  As  regards  Central  Italy  as  macro-region,  the  Regions  penalized  by 
regionalization  are  in  order:  the  Marche,  Lazio  and  Umbria.  The  Regions  to  benefit  are 
Abruzzo and Tuscany. The latter is the only Region in Central Italy whose Provinces are all 
better  off  with  regionalization.  All  the  Provinces  in  the  Marche,  on  the  contrary,  lose 
resources in favor of other parts of the macro-region. In Southern Italy, Calabria and Apulia 
are penalized by regionalization, while Campania, Molise and especially Basilicata gain net 
resources. In the two latter Regions - Molise and Basilicata - all the Provinces gain from 
regionalization. Finally as regards the Islands, there is a transfer of resources from Sicily to 
Sardinia. It is worth remembering that the overall data for administrative Regions and for 
Provinces conceals internal trends which can vary widely. There will be areas and farms that 
gain, or lose more or less than the average and areas and farms that lose, or gain more or less 
than the average. The major transfer of resources takes place between the Provinces of the 
Northern Italy “region”, where 11% of historic resources of the macro-region in question will 
change hands. Another part of Italy where there is a marked transfer of resources between 
Provinces is the Southern Italy macro-region, in which 10% of the historic resources of the 
same  “region”  will  be  transferred.  Less  significant,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  transfer  of 
resources between Provinces in the other two macro-regions (7% in Central Italy and 6% in 
the Islands). 14
Finally,  in  the  case  of  Italy  as  a  whole,  one  finds  a  much  more  significant 
redistribution of resources. Overall Southern and Northern Italy suffer a negative effect from 
regionalization (Fig. 3). In fact, the first loses 11% of historic resources and the second 5%. 
From a glance at Table 1 one can see that the administrative Regions most penalized are: 
Lombardy that in the  case of 50% regionalization including special entitlements loses 93 
million euros, followed by Apulia (83 million), Veneto (69 million euro) and Calabria (59 
million euro). The macro-regions that gain most are the Islands (+27%) and Central Italy 
(+16%).  The  administrative  Regions  that  come  out  best  are  Sardinia  (70  million  euro), 
Trentino Alto Adige (47 million euro), Tuscany (42 million euro) and Sicily (roughly 38 
million euro). 
Overall, 50% regionalization with national flat rate payment entails a redistribution of 
resources of 368 million euros, that is to say 10.3% of total support. 
With  the  increase  in  the  size  of  the  ”region”  comes  an  increase  in  the  resources 
transferred between areas. In the case of a “region” as an administrative Region the resources 
transferred between Provinces are equal to 212 million euro; this figure rises to 337 million 
euros in the case of a “region” defined as macro-regions and 368 million euro in the case of 
Italy as a single “region”. 
From the analysis just carried out it emerges that, regardless of whether one opts for a 
“region” defined in terms of macro-region, or Italy as a single “region”, and regardless of 
whether special entitlements are included or not, there are administrative Regions that, with 
regionalization, are better off in every case (Piedmont, Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto Adige, 
Liguria, Emilia Romagna, Abruzzo, Molise, Basilicata and Sardinia) and others that lose out 
in  every  case  (Lombardy,  Veneto,  Apulia  and  Calabria).  For  Calabria  and  Apulia,  for 
example,  this  happens  because  the  average  flat  rate  payment  in  the  two  hypotheses  of 
regionalization is lower that average per hectare payment matured over the historic period, 
determined to a large extent by high payments per hectare for olive oil. This is equally the 
case for Veneto, where historic support is mainly determined by high payments for arable 
crops, especially maize, and for Lombardy, where a high level of historic support, beside 
arable crops, is generated by high milk premiums included in the SPS from 2006. 
In other cases the position regarding the administrative Region is not so clear: Umbria, 
the Marche, Lazio and Sicily gain if the “region” is defined as the Italy as a whole (with or 
without special entitlements), whereas they lose out if “region” is defined as macro-region. 
On the contrary, Campania has everything to gain if “region” is defined as macro-region, 
while it is worse off if flat rate support is determined on the basis of Italy as a single ”region”. 
Yet, Friuli Venezia Giulia loses out with regionalization no matter which hypothesis is used, 
except  in  the  case  in  which  “region”  is  defined  at  the  level  of  macro-region  and  special 
entitlements are included. The Marche benefits if the “region” chosen is Italy, with or without 
special entitlements, and loses if support is calculated on the basis of macro-region, with or 
without special entitlements. 15
Expected effects of regionalization at farm level 
The analysis at farm level was carried out taking into account the hypotheses on the 
three  “regions”  in  only  the  scenario  in  which  special  entitlements  are  included  in  the 
regionalization.  This  is  because,  as  mentioned  in  Section  3,  it  is  not  possible  from  the 
information  available  on  the  FADN-ITALIA  data  to  trace  the  farms  which  held  special 
entitlements. The simulation, therefore, concerned the three percentages for the adoption of 
regionalization (100%, 50%, 10%); the aim was to find out how the distribution of support 
affected farms, depending on the percentage of regionalization adopted. 
The  analysis  on  farms  takes  into  consideration  inputs  of  single  flat  rate  payment 
determined in the previous territorial analysis for the nine different hypotheses in this study, 
and the value of support received in 2006 by the farms in the FADN sample, without the 
modulation. 
The effects on farms are evaluated at aggregate level for Italy as a whole
12 – what 
happens to the total of FADN farms in the different regionalization hypotheses – but clearly it 
is possible to aggregate the results of these analyses to level of the administrative Region. 
The number of the farms in the sample that see an increase in support of over 100% 
grows with the increase in the percentage of regionalization (passing from 10% to 50% to 
100%) and the increase in size of the reference “region” (moving from administrative Region, 
to macro-region, to Italy as a single “region”) (Tab. 2). The farms that more than double their 
support  vary  from  26%  in  the  case  of  a  “region”  equal  to  an  administrative  Region  and 
regionalization at 10%, to 45% in the case of Italy as a whole and regionalization at 100%. 
This quota includes the new beneficiary farms, i.e. those that did not benefit from the historic 
support under the CAP direct payments scheme and now, thanks to regionalization, fall within 
the ambit of the SPS. This is confirmed by the fact that the farms that more than double their 
historic support, in all the scenarios, are mainly vineyards especially for the production of 
quality wine, fruit and citrus fruits and horticulture (flowers and market gardens), in other 
words  farms  with  a  crop  land  use  that  had  not  enjoyed  support  in  the  past.  It  is  worth 
underlining the fact that, as regards farms that more than double their support, the average 
gain per farm does not exceed €6,550. Let us now turn to the farms that find themselves 
worse off with regionalization: between 9% and 11% of the farms in the sample, depending 
on the “region” considered, with a percentage of 100% regionalization lose over 50% of the 
historic support. This group includes mostly cattle farms (dairying and rearing) and olives 
farms. In this case the average loss varies between €26,500 and €33,700. Another group of 
farms, between 9% and 12%, loses between 25% and 50%. 
In  the  case  of  50%  regionalization  between  9%  and  11%  of  farms  in  the  sample, 
depending on the “region” considered, lose over 25% of the historic support. The maximum 
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percentage of farms that are worse off is recorded in the class in which support is reduced to 
between 25% and 10% (Fig. 4). Also in this case losses are concentrated among dairy farms 
(especially in the scenario in which the “region” is defined as administrative Region), olive 
farms  (especially  in  the  scenarios  where  Italy  is  a  single  “region”  and  where  “region”  is 
defined  as macro-region), cattle  farmers, who produce  for the meat market, cereal farms, 
oilseed and protein crops and rice production. 
In the case of 10% regionalization the farms that suffer are obviously concentrated in 
the single class considered (up to 10% less). 
Overall, a little over 30% of the farms in the sample transfer resources in favour of the 
remaining  70%  of  farms,  with  varying  differences  depending  on  the  size  of  the  “region” 
considered. In fact, in the case of “region” defined as administrative Region the farms that 
suffer with regionalization make up 36% of the total, which declines to 31% both in the case 
where region” is defined as macro-region and where Italy is defined as a single “region”. 
Now let us look at the distribution of farms per classes of variation of support (the 
difference between regionalized and historic support), in absolute values, (Tab. 3); in the case 
of 100% regionalization in the three hypotheses of “region”, it appears that the farms that are 
worse off are equally distributed in the class of losses below €10,000, with a hike in the class 
of a loss of between €2,000 and €5,000. At the other end of the scale, the gains are more 
equally distributed in the classes of between €500 and €5,000, with a hike in the classes of 
between €2,000 and €5,000.  
With 50% regionalization, it appears that the farms that are worse off, in the three 
hypotheses of “region”, are equally distributed in classes of losses below €5,000 and up to 
€500. At the opposite end, most of the better off farms are concentrated in the class with gains 
of between €500 and €1,000. 
Finally, in the case of regionalization at 10%, slightly over a quarter of the farms in the 
sample gain between €1 and €100. The farms that lose are concentrated in the class of losses 
of up to €100 (10% of all farms). 
From the analysis carried out so far, it emerges that the distribution of farms in the 
sample in classes of gains and losses vis-à-vis historic support expressed in percentages terms 
does not significantly change with an increase in the size of the “region” considered. The 
picture changes considerably, on the other hand, when we consider the distribution of farms in 
the move from one percentage of regionalization to another. In particular, in the hypothesis of 
100% regionalization the farms that lose out are more equally distributed over the four classes 
of loss considered. Those that gain are concentrated in the last class, i.e. the class with an 
increase in historic support of over 100%. The same thing happens when the hypothesis is 
50% regionalization, although the classes of loss are reduced in this case to three. Finally, in 
the case of 10% regionalization, all the farms that lose out are concentrated in the one class 17
considered  (up  to  -10%),  while  those  who  gain  are  concentrated  in  the  first  class,  which 
records a gain of between 1% and 10% and the last class with gains of over 100%. 
As  the  percentage  of  regionalization  declines  -  from  100%  to  50%  to  10%  -  the 
distribution  of  farms  with  respect  to  the  percent  of  variation  of  support  deriving  from 
regionalization tends to concentrate around the centre. An example of this is found in Figure 5 
where in only the scenario based on “region” as administrative Region is reported in which it 
is  clear  that,  on  the  assumption  of  10%  regionalization,  the  gains  and  losses  tend  to  be 
concentrated in the classes with extremes in variation. 
Yet, if we consider farms from the point of view of the type of farming (TF) (Tab. 4) 
the analysis highlights the fact that specialist horticulture (TF 20), vineyards (TF 31) and fruit 
and citrus fruit (TF 32) farms in the sample all record a clear gain from regionalization (in 
over 90% of cases, no matter which”region” is chosen or percentage of regionalization is 
adopted).  Specialized  goat  farms  (TF  4430)  and  granivore  farms  (TF  50)  both  gain:  the 
former in over 70% of cases, a figure that rises to 90% in the hypothesis of “region” as 
macro-region, the latter in slightly over 60% of cases. Most sheep farms (TF 4410) gain, if 
support is set at macro-region level or if Italy is treated as a single “region”, but the results are 
more balanced if support is fixed at administrative Region level. 
In a similar way, the analysis shows that over 90% of tobacco farms (TF 1441) and 
nearly all rice growers (TF 1320) are penalized by the regionalization of support. Moreover, 
in roughly 60% of cases, olives farms (TF 30) and dairy farms (TF 41) lose resources with 
regionalization. For specialist cattle-rearing and fattening farms (TF 42) the outcome varies 
depending on the scenario; nevertheless, we can say there is a certain balance between those 
that gain and those that lose out. 
In the evaluation of the results obtained it is necessary, however, to keep in mind 
certain implications of the assumptions on which they are based: 
- the analysis is carried out with reference to 2006, on the basis, therefore, of the 
decisions taken under the CAP at that time. Consequently, the historic date 2006 (from 
both AGEA and FADN sources) does not include the modifications stemming from the 
CMOs reform for fruit and vegetables and wine that came into force in 2008. This 
should lead to an overestimation of the positive redistribution effects of regionalization 
for “historic” producers of these products (in other words, the beneficiaries of new 
payments for these products, insofar as the historic support on the basis of which we 
have  evaluated  the  effects  of  regionalization  is  higher  that  the  one  actually 
hypothesized) and the areas that specialize in these products, and the negative effects 
for other producers and areas (that will benefit from an increase in the redistribution of 
resources through regionalization, as was the case with the introduction of support for 
wine and fruit and vegetables); 18
- the historic date 2006 does not include the cut in the ceiling for tobacco that 
will take place in 2010. This could lead to an overestimation of the negative effects for 
tobacco growers and areas, and of the positive effects for other producers and areas; 
- the historic date 2006 does not include the increase in the value of entitlements 
which beet producers will enjoy until 2010 for the progressive entry in force of the 
sugar CMO reform;  
- the hypotheses of regionalization are carried out without taking into account 
other proposals contained in the Health Check, that could influence the distribution of 
support, for example the increase in the minimum threshold at €250 and the inclusion in 
the SPS of certain other direct payments; 
- the impact of different scenarios is assessed with respect to the support (both 
historic and regionalized) before the application of the modulation. This means that the 
evaluations are neutral with respect to the decisions to be taken on the cut to be applied 
in order to transfer resources to rural development;  
- the calculation of the amount of resources distributed following regionalization 
is based on the historic data for 2006, which had already suffered a cut in order to 
support the national reserve. This could lead to a slight underestimation of flat rate 
payment (0.5%) that corresponds to the part of the national reserve put aside and not 
distributed in the form of entitlements up till 2006; 
- the results of the analysis at farm level for the Northern Italy macro-region and 
for Italy as a whole are affected by the lack of information in the FADN data on support 
received in 2006 for the farms in Emilia Romagna, that consequently were excluded 
from the simulations. This distorts, in the farm analysis, the redistributive effects in the 
ambit of these two “regions” whose sign is difficult to foresee;  
- the results of the analysis at farm level suffer from the fact that they are based 
on a sample of farms (taken from the FADN data) that excludes the smallest producers 
(those under 4 ESU - Economic Size Unit). The extent to which the crop land uses of 
the smallest farms in the historic period were different from the larger one will be 
reflected in a distortion of the redistribution effects calculated in this work. 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis carried out here has allowed us to quantify the redistribution effects at 
territorial and farm level of alternative hypotheses of regionalization in Italy. 
The  territorial  analysis  has  shown  that  also  when  the  “regions”  are  defined  as 
administrative Regions, the redistribution of resources within may be quite high, and this is a 19
function of the different systems of land crop use on which support was calculated in the 
historic reference period. 
In the case of “region” defined as macro-region, redistribution will be at the expense 
of Lombardy, Veneto, Apulia and Calabria in particular. These Regions, with land crop use 
which were highly subsidised in the past, can see resources today directed to their farms being 
re-diverted towards farms of other administrative Regions in the same macro-region. 
In the case of Italy as a single “region” the Southern Regions and, to a lesser extent, 
those of Northern Italy are the ones that will experience the adverse effects of distribution 
stemming from regionalization as the resources go to other parts of the country. 
As the size of the “region” increases, and hence with the move from “region” defined 
as  administrative  Region  to  that  defined  as  macro-region,  and  then  to  Italy  as  a  single 
“region”, the overall amount of resources to be redistributed between farms and areas grows. 
The loss or gain in each administrative Region, and the Provinces within the Region, will 
depend on the “distance” between per hectare payment received in the past, in turn related to 
the crop land uses in the reference period used for the calculation of the single payment. 
At a parity of “region”, the exclusion of special entitlements from regionalization does 
not generally lead to a significant added redistribution of resources within the “region”. 
The  increase  in  the  size  of  the  “region”,  moving  from  administrative  Region,  to 
macro-region  leads  to  a  redistribution  across  administrative  Regions  and  a  different 
distribution between the Provinces within them, with slight variations in absolute values of 
gains and losses depending on whether special entitlements are included or not. Yet in some 
cases the exclusion of special entitlements leads to a change in the net balance.  
The analysis at farm level was only considered regionalization on the assumption that 
special  entitlements  were  included  in  the  redistribution.  The  analysis  has  shown  that  the 
increase in size of the “region” considered increases the percentage of farms in the sample 
that  gain  compared  to  historic  support;  this  percentage  is  well  over  60%  in  all  the  cases 
considered. 
Among the farms that gain more than 100% are those specialized vineyards especially 
for  the  production  of  quality  wine,  fruit  and  citrus  fruits  farms,  horticulture  (flower  and 
market gardens) (apart from fruit and vegetables for processing) that, in the past, had never 
benefited  from  direct  support  under  the  CAP.  At  the  opposite  extreme,  the  farms  most 
damaged by regionalization are cattle farms especially dairy farms (above all, in the scenario 
where “region” is defined as administrative Region) and olive farms (especially in scenarios 
where  “region”  is  defined  as  macro-region  or  as  Italy  as  a  whole),  i.e.  productions  that 
benefited most in the past. 
The analysis has shown how, for farms whose crop land uses were heavily subsidised 
under the CAP in the past (olive and rice growers, and cattle farms), the losses increase with 20
the increase in the size of the reference “region”, because the internal crop land use become 
increasingly less uniform. The effect of redistribution, therefore, is greater the more diverse 
the crop land uses in the “region” considered in the past and hence the variability of per 
hectare support currently received by farms. 
To sum up, we can state that the effects of redistribution on farms stemming from 
regionalization are considerable and directly depend on the crop land use and the average per 
hectare support received in the reference period for the calculation of the historic single farm 
payment. The effects of redistribution are also closely linked with how “region” is defined: 
the larger the “region”, the greater may be the diversification of crop land use in the historic 
reference  period  (and,  thus,  the  per  hectare  support  received  today),  and  the  more  the 
redistribution  effects  will  be  felt.  Finally,  the  higher  the  percentage  of  regionalization 
adopted, the greater will be the redistribution of resources between farms (and areas). 
The  analysis  has  shown  that  the  direction  and  intensity  of  redistribution  change 
significantly depending on the choice of “region” and on the percentage of regionalization 
chosen. The decisions on whether to apply the regionalization and how it should be applied 
heavily depend on the objectives of agricultural policy in Italy, on the perception that the 
current  system  of  distribution  is  unfair  and  on  decision  makers’  ability  to  find  the  more 
equitable  and  acceptable  solution.  In  conclusion,  this  study  has  analysed  the  effects  of 
redistribution  on  the  basis  of  alternative  hypotheses  of  regionalization,  in  an  attempt  to 
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Fig. 1 – Italy. 50% regionalization; special entitlements included. Administrative Regions as “region”. 
Gains/losses in respect to historic support for Provinces in 2006 
 
Source: elaboration of ISTAT and AGEA data 
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Fig. 2 – Italy. 50% regionalization; special entitlements included. Macro-regions as “region”. Gains/losses 
in respect to historic support for Provinces in 2006 
 
Source: elaboration of ISTAT and AGEA data 
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Fig. 3 – Italy. 50% regionalization; special entitlements included. Italy as a single “region”. Gains/losses in 
respect to historic support for Provinces in 2006 
 




Fig. 4 - Italy. 50% regionalization. Farms (%) for class of % variation in support in the alternative 


















































































































Administrative Region Macro-region Italy
 
1 Excluding Emilia Romagna 
Source: elaborations on data from RICA, ISTAT and AGEA  
 
Fig.  5  -  Italy.  Farms  (%)  per  class  of  %  variation  in  support  on  the  assumption  of  “region”  as 





































































































1 Excluding Emilia Romagna 
Source: elaborations on data from RICA, ISTAT and AGEA  27
Tab.1 – Italy. Difference in absolute value (€) and percentage between the overall amount of support 
deriving from regionalization - in the hypothesis of a “region” as macro-region and a “region” as Italy as 
a whole, on the basis of 50% regionalization - and the overall amount of historic support in 2006
1 
    With special entitlements    Without special entitlements
 2 
    Macro-region  Italy    Macro-region  Italy 
 
  Difference  Difference  Difference  Difference 
  Administrative 
















Piedmont  22,153,789  7.6  4.327.627  1.5    16.685.515  5.7  2,648,893  0.9 
Valle d'Aosta  8,122,562  268.1  7,097,304  234.2    7.762.435  256.2  6,955,130  229.6 
Lombardy  -76,151,969  -16.0  -93,327,736  -19.6    -72,670,328  -15.3  -86,194,817  -18.1 
Trentino Alto A.  53,948,403  226.4  46,942,022  197.0    58,188,975  244.2  52,672,032  221.1 
Veneto  -55,095,950  -14.5  -69,396,235  -18.3    -50,328,294  -13.3  -61,588,579  -16.2 
Friuli V. G.  1,167,349  1.6  -2,731,368  -3.8    -252,726  -0.4  -3,322,641  -4.7 
Liguria  4,722,837  59.5  3,798,260  47.9    4,455,395  56.1  3,727,368  47.0 














  Tuscany  14,488,895  9.6  42,425,913  28.1    14,004,624  9.3  39,521,864  26.2 
Umbria  -4,992,248  -5.7  6,965,758  8.0    -5,328,474  -6.1  5,593,784  6.4 
Marche  -12,535,937  -9.6  3,952,548  3.0    -12,982,123  -9.9  2,078,204  1.6 
Lazio  -7,641,330  -4.7  15,184,487  9.4    -6,333,503  -3.9  14,515,245  9.0 
















Molise  12,927,086  27.3  4,740,876  10.0    12,695,741  26.9  3,999,770  8.5 
Campania  19,895,002  12.2  -2,880,327  -1.8    20,336,177  12.4  -3,857,387  -2.4 
Apulia  -35,866,800  -7.2  -83,464,325  -16.8    -36,981,768  -7.4  -87,543,224  -17.6 
Basilicata  41,602,251  41.6  21,107,114  21.1    40,993,668  41.0  19,222,285  19.2 








  Sicily  -19,012,539  -7.6  37,602,732  15.1    -20,217,437  -8.1  35,573,803  14.3 
Sardinia
  19,012,539  12.4  70,145,250  45.9    20,217,437  13.2  70,605,917  46.2 
                   
1 The 2006 historic support is the value of the entitlements attributed before the application of the modulation 
2 Entitlements with the derogation to possess a number of eligible hectares equal to the number of entitlements. 
These  include  special  entitlements,  special  entitlements  to  rent  milk  quotas  and  livestock  lease  special 
entitlements 
Source: elaboration of ISTAT and AGEA data 28 
Tab. 2 - Italy. Gains/losses of farms (%) and farms (n) per class of % variation in support deriving from the regionalization in the three hypotheses of “region” on the 
basis of three percentages of regionalization (100%,50%,10%) – 2006 
  100% regionalization 
  Administrative Region    Macro-region    Italy 












  (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€) 
-50%>  -41,312,211  1,556  -26,550    -42,796,268  1,289  -33,201    -43,405,321  1,286  -33,752 
-50%≤ and <-25%  -11,930,615  1,739  -6,861    -11,716,680  1,522  -7,698    -9,422,449  1,209  -7,794 
-25%≤ and <-10%  -2,504,073  1,057  -2,369    -2,783,085  1,038  -2,681    -3,140,425  1,182  -2,657 
-10%≤ and <0%  -446,003  659  -677    -394,266  582  -677    -516,888  719  -719 
≥0% and <10%  276,573  515  537    257,027  619  415    272,770  601  454 
≥10% and <25%  1,484,852  760  1,954    1,175,560  796  1,477    1,174,825  763  1,540 
≥25% and <50%  2,907,214  924  3,146    2,602,505  941  2,766    2,530,411  909  2,784 
≥50% and <100%  4,255,719  1,067  3,988    4,504,510  1,067  4,222    4,909,173  1,112  4,415 
≥100%  28,588,454  5,823  4,910    38,093,138  6,246  6,099    40,435,074  6,319  6,399 
Total  -18,680,090  14,100  -1,325    -11,057,560  14,100  -784    -7,162,830  14,100  -508 
   
  50% regionalization 
  Administrative Region    Macro-region    Italy 












  (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€) 
-50%>  -  -  -    -  -  -    -  -  - 
-50%≤ and <-25%  -20,656,105  1,556  -13,275    -21,398,134  1,289  -16,601    -21,702,660  1,286  -16,876 
-25%≤ and <-10%  -6,474,441  2,084  -3,107    -6,543,029  1,863  -3,512    -5,409,891  1,584  -3,415 
-10%≤ and <0%  -965,904  1,371  -705    -903,987  1,279  -707    -1,129,990  1,526  -740 
≥0% and <10%  507,118  1,026  494    492,273  1,181  417    471,276  1,125  419 
≥10% and <25%  1,827,201  1,173  1,558    1,525,272  1,175  1,298    1,517,727  1,148  1,322 





Tab. 2 cont. 
≥50% and <100%  2,415,229  888  2,720    3,113,025  1,059  2,940    3,619,264  1,051  3,444 
≥100%  11,878,998  4,935  2,407    15,933,544  5,187  3,072    16,598,273  5,268  3,151 
Total  -9,340,045  14,100  -662    -5,528,780  14,100  -392    -3,581,415  14,100  -254 
                       
  10% regionalization 
  Administrative Region    Macro-region    Italy 












  (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€) 
-50%>  -  -  -    -  -  -    -  -  - 
-50%≤ and <-25%  -  -  -    -  -  -    -  -  - 
-25%≤ and <-10%  -  -  -    -  -  -    -  -  - 
-10%≤ and <0%  -5,619,290  5,011  -1,121    -5,769,030  4,431  -1,302    -5,648,508  4,396  -1,285 
≥0% and <10%  892,436  3,266  273    853,960  3,423  249    888,718  3,385  263 
≥10% and <25%  673,855  1,116  604    789,705  1,321  598    967,568  1,354  715 
≥25% and <50%  508,257  641  793    709,408  702  1,011    737,992  727  1,015 
≥50% and <100%  270,984  318  852    529,052  410  1,290    525,656  406  1,295 
≥100%  1,405,749  3,748  375    1,781,148  3,813  467    1,812,291  3,832  473 
Total  -1,868,009  14,100  -132    -1,105,756  14,100  -78    -716,283  14,100  -51 
1 Excluding Emilia Romagna 










Tab. 3 - Italy. Overall gains/losses of farms (%) and farms (n) per class of % variation in support deriving from the regionalization in the three hypotheses of “region” on the 
basis of three percentages of regionalization (100%,50%,10%) - 2006
1 
  100% regionalization 
  Administrative Region    Macro-region    Italy 












  (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€) 
-200,000>  -17,021,122  41  -415,149    -18,453,380  43  -429,148    -18,715,714  43  -435,249 
-200,000≤ and <-100,000  -5,383,581  39  -138,041    -5,979,899  44  -135,907    -6,459,514  47  -137,436 
-100,000≤ and <-50,000  -8,971,332  131  -68,483    -8,962,113  130  -68,939    -8,791,574  126  -69,774 
-50,000≤ and <-10,000  -14,783,998  692  -21,364    -15,951,053  732  -21,791    -14,726,922  688  -21,405 
-10,000≤ and <-5,000  -4,531,383  653  -6,939    -3,852,255  544  -7,081    -3,426,733  485  -7,065 
-5,000≤ and <-2,000  -3,609,954  1,125  -3,209    -2,953,482  916  -3,223    -2,684,916  834  -3,219 
-2,000≤ and <-1,000  -1,262,013  860  -1,467    -920,138  642  -1,430    -1,051,361  727  -1,446 
-1,000≤ and <-500  -430,173  589  -730    -423,836  578  -732    -425,763  582  -732 
-500≤ and <-300  -116,739  293  -398    -117,983  296  -399    -122,140  308  -397 
-300≤ and <-100  -71,865  368  -195    -68,249  339  -200    -70,145  347  -202 
-100≤ and <0  -10,742  220  -49    -7,911  167  -46    -10,302  209  -49 
≥0 and <100  29,480  521  57    18,950  334  57    19,657  329  60 
≥100 and <300  206,688  1,070  193    175,782  885  199    180,052  895  201 
≥300 and <500  295,273  740  399    321,030  806  399    309,300  775  399 
≥500 and <1,000  1,045,917  1,427  733    1,228,614  1657  742    1,188,434  1623  732 
≥1,000 and <2,000  2,568,591  1,779  1,444    2,891,725  1991  1,452    2,903,409  2020  1,437 
≥2,000 and <5,000  6,066,559  1,919  3,161    6,761,261  2141  3,157    6,371,726  2029  3,140 
≥5,000 and <10,000  5,620,866  811  6,931    5,787,029  822  7,040    6,390,216  913  6,999 
≥10,000 and <50,000  14,537,550  738  19,699    18,738,799  907  20,660    20,686,306  980  21,108 
≥50,000  7,141,888  84  85,022    10,709,551  126  84,996    11,273,152  140  80,523 






Tab. 3 cont. 
  50% regionalization 
  Administrative Region    Macro-region    Italy 












  (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€) 
-200,000>  -5,490,308  18  -305,017    -5,814,928  18  -323,052    -5,895,834  18  -327,546 
-200,000≤ and <-100,000  -3,020,253  23  -131,315    -3,411,762  25  -136,470    -3,462,023  25  -138,481 
-100,000≤ and <-50,000  -2,691,790  39  -69,020    -2,989,950  44  -67,953    -3,229,757  47  -68,718 
-50,000≤ and <-10,000  -9,195,650  437  -21,043    -9,544,078  449  -21,256    -8,957,862  417  -21,482 
-10,000≤ and <-5,000  -2,682,015  386  -6,948    -2,912,505  413  -7,052    -2,801,385  397  -7,056 
-5,000≤ and <-2,000  -2,847,572  912  -3,122    -2,375,189  743  -3,197    -2,125,650  670  -3,173 
-2,000≤ and <-1,000  -1,223,096  866  -1,412    -1,027,680  717  -1,433    -930,174  649  -1,433 
-1,000≤ and <-500  -631,006  860  -734    -460,069  642  -717    -525,680  727  -723 
-500≤ and <-300  -176,271  447  -394    -175,244  445  -394    -175,366  446  -393 
-300≤ and <-100  -118,349  604  -196    -117,132  601  -195    -121,334  623  -195 
-100≤ and <0  -20,140  419  -48    -16,614  334  -50    -17,475  377  -46 
≥0 and <100  57,113  1,102  52    41,697  772  54    42,614  773  55 
≥100 and <300  309,952  1,597  194    320,802  1,633  196    322,387  1,625  198 
≥300 and <500  421,614  1,059  398    509,689  1,277  399    483,721  1,224  395 
≥500 and <1,000  1,284,296  1,779  722    1,445,862  1,991  726    1,451,704  2,020  719 
≥1,000 and <2,000  2,204,462  1,549  1,423    2,438,009  1,720  1,417    2,296,355  1,629  1,410 
≥2,000 and <5,000  3,639,250  1,181  3,081    3,836,136  1,243  3,086    4,084,616  1,313  3,111 
≥5,000 and <10,000  3,306,588  476  6,947    3,832,841  552  6,944    3,945,181  566  6,970 
≥10,000 and <50,000  6,209,017  330  18,815    8,850,458  453  19,537    10,188,451  527  19,333 
≥50,000  1,324,113  16  82,757    2,040,877  28  72,888    1,846,097  27  68,374 






Tab. 3 cont. 
  10% regionalization 
  Administrative Region    Macro-region    Italy 












  (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€)    (€)  (n.)  (€) 
-200,000>  -  -  -    -  -  -    -  -  - 
-200,000≤ and <-100,000  -221,058  2  -110,529    -223,492  2  -111,746    -224,081  2  -112,041 
-100,000≤ and <-50,000  -419,269  6  -69,878    -703,469  11  -63,952    -813,827  13  -62,602 
-50,000≤ and <-10,000  -1,600,143  72  -22,224    -1,516,367  74  -20,491    -1,479,615  75  -19,728 
-10,000≤ and <-5,000  -897,133  131  -6,848    -896,211  130  -6,894    -879,157  126  -6,977 
-5,000≤ and <-2,000  -941,997  306  -3,078    -1,012,604  319  -3,174    -912,415  291  -3,135 
-2,000≤ and <-1,000  -536,403  386  -1,390    -582,501  413  -1,410    -560,277  397  -1,411 
-1,000≤ and <-500  -453,138  653  -694    -385,226  544  -708    -342,673  485  -707 
-500≤ and <-300  -227,699  581  -392    -188,604  484  -390    -169,482  436  -389 
-300≤ and <-100  -259,498  1404  -185    -198,758  1074  -185    -204,145  1125  -181 
-100≤ and <0  -62,952  1470  -43    -61,798  1380  -45    -62,835  1446  -43 
≥0 and <100  157,736  3758  42    174,438  3682  47    169,744  3622  47 
≥100 and <300  491,523  2732  180    550,623  3060  180    538,268  3038  177 
≥300 and <500  371,992  966  385    414,675  1072  387    389,246  1011  385 
≥500 and <1,000  562,087  811  693    578,703  822  704    639,022  913  700 
≥1,000 and <2,000  661,318  476  1,389    766,568  552  1,389    789,036  566  1,394 
≥2,000 and <5,000  792,437  262  3,025    1,107,312  355  3,119    1,279,594  414  3,091 
≥5,000 and <10,000  449,366  68  6,608    662,780  98  6,763    758,096  113  6,709 
≥10,000 and <50,000  264,823  16  16,551    408,175  28  14,578    369,219  27  13,675 
≥50,000  -  -  -    -  -  -    -  -  - 
Total  -1,868,009  14,100  -132    -1,105,756  14,100  -78    -716,283  14,100  -51 
1 Excluding Emilia Romagna 
Source: elaborations on data from RICA, ISTAT and AGEA  
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Tab. 4 - Italy. Farms (%) that gain from regionalization classed in terms of type of farming (TF) in three 
alternative hypotheses of “region” - 2006
1 
  Administrative 
Region 
  Macro-region    Italy 
           
13 - Specialist cereals, oilseed and protein crops.  44    45    35 
    of which 1310 - Specialist COP (other than rice)  48    49    39 
                   1320 - Rice  4    2    1 
14 - General field cropping  64    67    70 
    of which 1441 - Specialist tobacco  10    10    10 
20 - Specialist horticulture  94    95    95 
31 - Specialist vineyards  93    95    96 
32 - Specialist fruit and citrus fruit  94    96    96 
    of which 3211 - Specialist fresh fruits (other than 
citrus)  94    97    97 
                  3212 - Specialist nuts  98    98    98 
33 - Specialist olives  42    40    39 
34 - Various permanent crops combined  79    80    83 
41 - Specialist dairying  35    43    42 
42 - Specialist cattle-rearing and fattening  50    52    55 
43 - Cattle-dairying, rearing and fattening combined  38    69    64 
    of which 4310 - Dairying with rearing & fattening  36    68    63 
                  4320 - Rearing & fattening with dairying  57    79    79 
44 - Sheep, goats and other grazing livestock  63    72    81 
    of which 4410 - Sheep  56    65    78 
                  4430 - Goats  77    90    83 
50 - Specialist granivores  69    62    62 
1 Excluding Emilia Romagna 
Source: elaborations on data from RICA, ISTAT and AGEA  
 
 